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Cross-border dividend taxation and the preferences of taxable and non-taxable 
investors: Evidence from Canada 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
We consider how fund managers respond to the conflicting preferences of their investors.  
We focus on the conflict between the taxable and retirement accounts of international 
funds, which face different tradeoffs between dividends and capital gains.  In principle, 
managers could resolve this conflict through dividend arbitrage, but a proprietary 
database of dividend-arbitrage transactions shows that in practice they cannot.  Thus, 
managers must resolve it through their investment policies, and we find robust evidence 
that managers with more retirement money favor the preferences of retirement investors.  
We find more evidence for this view in the difference between U.S. and Canadian funds’ 
portfolio weights.
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1. Introduction 
 A fund manager is an agent for diverse principals.  His investors have something 
in common, that they chose his fund over others, but they can otherwise vary in what they 
want from him.  One likely source of this variation is the tax code - in particular, its 
differing treatment of retirement and non-retirement accounts.  Dividends and capital 
gains deliver different after-tax benefits to these two major account types, but the typical 
fund contains both types.  Thus, the typical fund manager must serve these two 
preferences with one policy. 
Retirement money varies in proportion from one fund to the next.  This variation 
creates an opportunity to explore investment policies along a new and important 
dimension: by relating the variation of retirement money to that of a policy choice that 
favors retirement money, we can gauge the role of shareholders’ preferences in their 
funds’ investment policies.  That is our goal in this paper. 
Our research question is closest in spirit to that of Barclay, Pearson and Weisbach 
(1998), who consider an agency problem arising from managers’ appetite for new 
investment.  They demonstrate that funds trade off the welfare of their current and 
prospective taxable accounts in their realization of capital gains, and Bergstresser and 
Poterba (2002) extend this analysis to the whole range of tax burdens on taxable 
accounts.  We apply their trade-off analysis to the competing interests within a fund’s 
current accounts, the retirement accounts against the non-retirement accounts, and we 
focus on a policy and a venue where this competition is easily observed. 
The policy is dividend yield, and the venue is international equity funds.  In this 
venue, dividend policy trades off retirement and non-retirement accounts because cross-
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border dividends incur a tax which taxable accounts can reclaim as a tax credit, but non-
taxable accounts cannot.  The result, under the post-2002 tax code, is a stronger aversion 
to dividends, relative to capital gains, among international funds’ retirement accounts 
than among their non-retirement accounts.  Thus, looking across international funds, we 
see the role of shareholders’ preferences in their funds’ policies in the relation of 
retirement money to dividend policy. 
A virtue of addressing dividend policy, rather than other tax-related policies, is 
that it is easily observed.  That is, a fund’s ex post dividend yield is easily observed, and 
it is also highly representative of the fund’s ex ante dividend policy because dividends are 
highly predictable.  By contrast, a fund’s capital gains and capital gains realizations 
reflect not only ex ante policy but also ensuing price movements, fund flows and 
reinvestment ideas that are much less predictable, and therefore much less representative 
of policy decisions. 
Cross-border dividend policy has a second dimension which is not so easily 
observed.  This is the dimension of dividend arbitrage, where funds avoid cross-border 
withholding by lending shares back across the border for their dividend record dates, and 
splitting the tax savings with the borrower through the lending fee.  This tactic converts 
the tax credit into the lending fee, so it is Pareto-improving only if the fee is at least the 
credit.  Otherwise, it leaves the fund’s non-retirement accounts worse off.  Thus, the 
connection between funds’ cross-border dividend policies and the relative welfare of their 
retirement and non-retirement accounts hinges on the pricing of dividend-arbitrage 
transactions.  But while the literature on dividends is extensive, it does not cover this 
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pricing, presumably because such data is proprietary.  That is where our proprietary 
database is instrumental. 
Our data show the fees that lenders get for their credits, in the case of U.S. lenders 
of Canadian shares. We see a year of loans of Canadian securities by a large U.S. lending 
agent, including over $600MM of loans on dividend record-dates.  This means we can 
observe the fees, calculate the credits, and thereby observe the crucial pricing: the fees 
that lenders get for their credits. 
Our key finding with the proprietary data is that arbitrage is useful but 
incomplete.  Lending fees convert only some of the tax credit into cash, falling 
significantly short of the full amount.  This shortfall means that cross-border dividends 
impose a net tax on a mutual fund’s retirement accounts, and therefore that the welfare 
effect of its cross-border dividend policy depends on how much retirement money it 
serves. 
So how do managers resolve this conflict between their account types?  We take 
this question to the cross section of international equity funds.  For the funds in our 
sample we have the proportion of defined-contribution money in its assets, as of year-end 
2002, and we have the relevant measures of its cross-border dividend policy in fiscal-year 
2003: the dividends paid by its portfolio, and the tax withheld from these dividends.  We 
ask three questions.  As retirement money goes up, does dividend yield go down?  Does 
withholding tax go down?  And, as dividend-arbitrage activity would imply, does the 
withholding tax per unit of dividend yield go down? 
The answer to all three questions is yes.  As retirement money grows, investment 
policies increasingly favor retirement accounts.  This is true, we show, even if we control 
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for the subcategories of international funds, both Lipper’s index groupings and 
Morningstar’s style boxes, so our finding does not result from retirement investors 
gravitating toward more-suitable fund types.  We also observe that this is contrary to 
what would happen if managers simply maximized the total returns we observe. 
As a robustness check, we repeat the regressions on a sample of domestic funds, 
where the taxation of retirement accounts is unaffected by dividend yield.   If domestic 
funds’ retirement allocations relate to their dividend yields anyhow, then our 
international-fund results may reflect some other preferences at work.  But the 
regressions find no relation, supporting our explanation for the international-fund results. 
The final tests turn from individual funds to aggregate cross-border holdings.  
This analysis focuses on the U.S./Canada border because it corresponds to the holdings 
data, and also because – for reasons we detail below – the countries’ differing regulations 
impart differences in after-tax preferences that deliver testable predictions for differences 
in their holdings.  Again, we find the cross-sectional variation of funds’ investment 
policies lines up with the variation in their shareholders’ preferences. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the data, 
Section 3 covers the relevant background, Section 4 addresses dividend-arbitrage revenue 
in Canada and dividend-arbitrage volume in the United Kingdom, Section 5 addresses the 
cross-sections of international and domestic mutual funds, Section 6 addresses the 
aggregate portfolios of Canada and the U.S., and Section 7 summarizes and concludes. 
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2. Data 
 The equity-lending data is the data used in Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002), where 
it is described in detail.  For the purposes of this study, a few facts are important.  First, 
the data cover some Canadian firms because they cover all U.S.-listed stocks, and some 
Canadian stocks list in the U.S.  These are not ADRs, but rather the same security that 
trades in Canada (see Eun and Sabherwal, 2003).  Second, for each loan we have the 
lending fee.  When the loan collateral is cash, the lending fee is a rebate reduction on 
interest earned by the lender on the collateral, and when collateral is in-kind, the lending 
fee is simply a cash payment from the borrower to the lender.  The fee is annualized, so 
when we use it we must de-annualize.  Finally, we have one year, 11/98 through 10/99, of 
data, and the lender is a large U.S. custodian bank with trillions of dollars in custody, so 
the loan amounts are significant, often in millions or tens of millions of dollars. 
 In addition to the loan-price database covering US-listed stocks, we also have a 
loan-volume database covering UK-listed stocks.  This data is from CRESTCO, the UK 
clearing corporation, and it covers the FTSE 250 and FTSE 100 (as well as a few non-UK 
stocks, which we disregard).  For each day and each stock we have the total number of 
shares held through CRESTCO, which is generally very close to the total shares 
outstanding of the stock, and we also have the total number of those shares that are out on 
loan.  From Bloomberg we have dividend amounts and record dates for the same stocks. 
 The sample of international funds starts with data purchased from Pensions and 
Investments.  The periodical surveyed mutual funds, asking them their dollar amount of 
defined-contribution retirement savings as of 12/31/02.  This is not precisely the same as 
all retirement money, because some mutual funds hold some defined-benefit assets as 
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well, but the size of the difference appears small.1  Of the international funds that 
responded, we take all funds for which FY 2003 SEC filings and 12/31/02 total net assets 
are available, and from those we take the 64 funds with at least $100M under 
management as of 12/31/02.  Note that we do not include global funds, because they 
invest also in domestic equities, and we are interested only in funds where all dividends 
are cross-border.  This sample represents about half, by dollar value, of the universe of 
international funds.2  For each fund we get its FY 2003 withholding tax and dividend 
income from the Statement of Operations in its Annual Report, and we get its total net 
assets as of the beginning, middle and end of FY 2003 from its Annual and Semiannual 
Reports.  Summary statistics of the sample are provided in Table 1. 
 For a robustness check of our international-fund results, we collect the analogous 
sample of domestic funds.  From the domestic funds that responded to the P&I survey we 
take all funds for which FY 2003 SEC filings and 12/31/02 total net assets are available, 
and which have at least $100M under management as of 12/31/02.  This yields a sample 
of 434 funds, and we collect their dividend income and total net assets analogously to the 
international-fund sample. 
 The data on portfolio holdings are from two databases compiled by Thomson 
Financial: the 13f database and the mutual-fund database.  The 13f database includes both 
U.S. and Canadian institutions, and shows the holdings of all U.S.-listed stocks by 
institutions that hold at least $100M worth, and that do some business in the U.S.  
                                                 
1 According to the 2003 Mutual Fund Fact Book, $11BB of the $158BB of retirement money in foreign 
equity mutual funds as of 12/31/02 “[i]ncludes 457 plans, private defined benefit plans, state and local 
government employee retirement funds, Keoghs, and other defined contribution plans without 401(k) 
features.” (p. 56). 
 
2 According to the 2003 Mutual Fund Fact Book, the sum of International, Emerging Market and Regional 
(but not Global) funds’ assets was $217.6BB as of 12/31/02, about twice the $117.1BB in Table 1. 
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Because, as discussed above, some Canadian firms list in the U.S., this means we see 
both U.S. and Canadian investment in both U.S. and Canadian stocks.  We use the 13f 
data for 12/31/2000; the SEC’s Official List of 13f Securities for 12/31/2000 lists the 
stocks that institutions had to disclose.  For each of these stocks, we take its dividend 
yield to be the dividends paid in 2001 divided by the 12/31/00 price, as reported in the 
CRSP data.  The Mutual Fund database includes both U.S. and Canadian mutual funds; 
we use the most recent disclosures as of 12/31/2000.   The holdings data cover spot but 
not derivative holdings, which is why (as discussed in detail below) they cover the U.S. 
holdings of general-purpose, but not RSP, Canadian international-equity funds. 
 
3. Background 
We briefly summarize the relevant empirical literature on mutual funds in Section 
3.1.  In Section 3.2 we show that, for our sample, retirement accounts prefer capital gains 
over dividends, whereas non-retirement accounts have less or zero preference.  Section 
3.3 provides the necessary information on dividend arbitrage, with details collected in the 
Appendix. 
 
3.1. Literature 
 Mutual funds have emerged as an ideal hunting ground for breakdowns of agency.  
This is partly because they present a classic principal/agent problem, partly because the 
trillions under management make even small breakdowns economically important, and 
partly because the data are so good.  Also, the literature’s skepticism about managers’ 
ability to add value (e.g., Jensen, 1968) begs the question of what else they could try to 
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do.  Considering this context, our research question about a potential success of agency is 
a departure.  In this section we run briefly through some of the findings that frame our 
own. 
 A primary focus of the literature on agency problems is the tradeoff between 
servicing current accounts and attracting new ones.  Perhaps the best-known source of 
this tradeoff is the convex relation of new investment to recent performance (Ippolito, 
1992, Goetzmann and Peles, 1997, Sirri and Tufano, 1998).  The convexity links funds’ 
risk choices to their expected future assets, and a growing literature (Brown, Harlow and 
Starks, 1996, Chevalier and Ellison, 1997, Busse, 2001, Nanda, Wang and Zheng, 2003) 
addresses the resulting effect on investment policies.  Similarly, this convexity pushes a 
quarter’s winning funds toward quarter-end purchases of stocks they already hold 
(Carhart, Kaniel, Musto and Reed, 2002). 
 Besides the flow/performance relation, another source of tradeoffs is capital-gains 
realizations.  Funds accelerate the tax liabilities of their current taxable accounts when 
they realize capital gains (Jeffrey and Arnott, 1993, Dickson and Shoven, 1994), but by 
the same token they decelerate the tax liabilities of their future taxable accounts (Barclay, 
Pearson and Weisbach, 1998).  This encourages more realizations by funds with better 
prospects for attracting new investment, and that is what we see empirically in the cross 
section (Barclay et al., 1998).  It is not as clear whether this policy has its intended effect, 
because while Barclay et al. (1998) find that funds’ growth rates respond negatively to 
capital gains’ “overhang,” Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) find little or no difference 
between the response of new retail investment, which they take to be largely taxable, and 
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that of new institutional investment, which they take to be largely non-taxable, to the 
fund’s tax burden. 
 Our empirical question concerns tradeoffs within funds’ current accounts.  
Differences between funds’ current accounts have already been shown to be important in 
several respects.  In Johnson (2003), investors with short horizons are shown to impose 
significant transactions costs on those with longer horizons.  In several recent studies 
(Goetzmann, Ivkovic and Rouwenhorst, 2001, Chalmers, Edelen and Kadlec, 2001, 
Greene and Hodges, 2002) and many subsequent news reports, accounts trading on stale 
prices are shown to impose significant dilution costs on the remaining accounts.  This is 
especially true for international funds (though perhaps less so for our FY 2003 sample 
period, when enforcement increased).  And Christoffersen and Musto (2002) argue that 
accounts that survive more attrition are relatively less price sensitive, with implications 
for pricing policies. 
 
3.2 Relative Preferences of Retirement and Non-retirement Accounts 
 Earlier work (e.g., Bergstresser and Poterba, 2002) shows that taxable accounts 
get more, after tax, from capital gains than from dividends, but retirement accounts do 
not.  Thus, it would seem that taxable accounts prefer capital gains more than retirement 
accounts do.  But for two reasons, the opposite is true for our sample.  The first reason is 
that retirement accounts pay a tax on cross-border dividends that they do not pay on 
capital gains.  The second reason is that after 2002, taxable accounts marginal rates are 
the same for dividends and long-term capital gains.  The next two sections document 
these reasons in detail. 
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3.2.1 Tax Retirement Accounts Pay on Cross-Border Dividends 
 Three elements of tax law combine to create the tax that mutual funds’ retirement 
accounts pay on cross-border dividends.  First, major economies generally tax dividends 
headed over the border (see, e.g., Callaghan and Barry, 2003).  The tax rate can depend 
on bilateral treaties; the usual rate, and the rate for the U.S./Canada border, is 15%.  
Second, taxable accounts generally get a full offsetting credit for foreign tax paid, so for 
them the tax generally means nothing.  By contrast, non-taxable accounts get no credit, so 
to them this is a net tax.  Third, dedicated pension funds can apply for exemption from 
the tax, but mutual funds cannot, not if they are open to taxable accounts.  Few if any 
U.S. funds – and none of the funds in our sample – are structured to be exempt from 
withholding.  The structure of Canadian mutual funds is quite different in this respect, a 
difference we explain and exploit below in Section 6. 
 How economically significant is the tax that cross-border dividends impose on 
retirement accounts?  Table 1 shows $330.4MM of withholding in FY 2003 on $127.0B 
of average total net assets, or 26bp per year.  At this rate, retirement savers lose 4% of 
their international-equity savings over a 30-year career.3  As 4% is in the neighborhood 
of a year of spending from retirement savings, this is an economically significant impact 
on U.S. consumers. 
 
3.2.2 Taxation of Dividends and Capital Gains in FY 2003 
 How does the preference of international funds’ retirement accounts for dividends 
compare to that of its taxable accounts?  Our sample period is FY 2003, so the relevant 
                                                 
3 A saver investing evenly over 30 years has the average dollar invested 15 years, and 15(26bp)=3.9%. 
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question is how the tax code of this period treats the dividends and capital gains of 
retirement and non-retirement accounts.  The sample falls primarily in one tax regime but 
spills a little into another; four fifths of the sample (i.e. 79% of the fund-months) are in 
2003 and the remaining fifth in 2002, and the tax regime changes after 2002.  Thus our 
primary interest is in after-tax returns in the 2003 regime, but the earlier regime is worth 
reviewing. 
 For retirement accounts, the answer is simple and the same for both 2003 and 
earlier: capital gains are better.  This is because these accounts pay one tax at retirement 
on accumulated dividends and capital gains, but they pay an extra tax, the foreign tax, on 
the dividends.  The first column of Table 2, Panel A, illustrates this.  If we let τT be the 
tax applied at retirement, τF be the foreign tax and n be the number of shares of a mutual 
fund, then the value to a share in a retirement account of an additional $1 of dividends is 
$1(1−τT)(1−τF)/n, whereas the value of an additional $1 of capital gains is $1(1−τT)/n.  So 
the retirement accounts of international funds, whatever the tax brackets of their owners, 
strictly prefer capital gains to dividends. 
 For non-retirement accounts, the answer is simple for 2003 and murkier for 2002.  
In 2003, these accounts are largely indifferent between dividends and capital gains.  This 
is because the 2003 tax code equalizes the tax rate on “qualified” dividends with the rate 
on capital gains distributions and long-term capital gains.  Since international funds’ 
dividends are overwhelmingly “qualified”,4 this means that taxable accounts pay exactly 
or nearly the same rate on dividends, capital-gains distributions and long-term capital 
                                                 
4 For example, 100% of the ordinary dividends paid in 2003 by the largest international fund, American 
Funds’ EuroPacific Growth Fund, are qualified (from the tax information on the American funds website, 
www.americanfunds.com). 
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gains.  In principle an investor might lower his expected tax rate on a capital gain by 
deferring redemption but he cannot possibly lower it more than the maximum rate of 
15%, and since 15% is the standard value for τF, this means that even with perfect 
foresight and planning he cannot prefer capital gains over dividends more than retirement 
accounts do.5  And perfect planning is not feasible with mutual-fund shares anyway, 
since mutual funds realize and distribute capital gains eventually and on the same 
schedule for all their shareholders.  Thus, in the new tax regime, non-retirement accounts 
are indifferent, or at least more indifferent than retirement accounts, between dividends 
and capital gains. 
For comparison with the retirement case, we present non-retirement accounts 
analogously in the second column of Table 2, Panel A, denoting the tax rates on 
dividends and capital gains with τD and τG, respectively.  These are about the same for 
2003, but for 2002 they are different for higher-income investors.  The tax situation for 
2002 is essentially the one described by Bergstresser and Poterba (2002), who observe 
that investors in higher tax brackets earn more, post-tax, from long-term capital gains 
than from dividends.  They also observe that the median mutual-fund dollar appears to 
come from such a bracket, though it is much less likely that the median mutual fund 
investor does.6  So in 2002 some non-retirement accounts share retirement accounts’ 
aversion to dividends, and some do not. 
                                                 
5 That is, a retirement account values $0.85 of capital gains the same as $1 of dividends, and the non-
retirement account values $0.85 of capital gains at no more than $1 of dividends.  See Blouin, Raedy and 
Shackelford for a catalogue of capital-gains-tax reduction tactics. 
6 The characterization of the median mutual-fund investor in the 2003 Mutual Fund Fact Book puts the 
median investor in a low bracket.  The median investor is married with a household income of $62,100, as 
of 2001.  In 2001 (and also 2002), a married household with two kids, standard deductions and that income 
would have been in the 15% tax bracket. 
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To summarize, all retirement investors prefer capital gains to dividends for our 
whole sample.  Also, they prefer less foreign withholding tax.  In contrast, all non-
retirement accounts have less or zero preference between dividends and capital gains for 
four fifths of our sample, and for many this holds in the remaining fifth as well.  Also, 
non-retirement accounts are indifferent to foreign withholding tax.  Thus, funds benefit 
their retirement accounts in our sample period by reducing dividend yield and foreign 
withholding tax. 
3.3 Dividend Arbitrage 
 There is one thing fund managers can do to help their non-taxable accounts with 
respect to this tax, and that is dividend arbitrage.  The basic idea of cross-border dividend 
arbitrage (see McDonald, 2001, and Dai and Rydqvist, 2002) is to move shares back to 
their home countries for the record dates of their dividends, and to split the resulting tax 
savings through the pricing of the transaction.  If the pricing gives the fund manager all 
the tax savings, then it eliminates the tax on non-taxable accounts, while having no effect 
on taxable accounts.  However, if the pricing gives less than all of the tax savings, then it 
reduces the tax on non-taxable accounts, while having a negative effect on taxable 
accounts. 
 To show this formally, we can go back to Table 2, and consider what happens if 
the fund arbitrages a fraction a of its dividend income of 1.  That is, the fund takes a of 
the dividend-paying shares and transfers them to an investor in the shares’ home country.  
Because this foreign investor is not withheld, he gets their full cash dividend of a, rather 
than the a−τFa cash that the fund would have received.  Therefore, ignoring the tax credit 
for the moment, the gains from trade are τFa, and we can denote the fund’s share of these 
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gains with x: the fund gets a−τFa+xa in cash and the foreign investor gets (τF-x)a.  
Nobody gets a tax credit on the arbitraged portion, because no foreign tax was paid.  The 
resulting values for retirement and non-retirement accounts are in Panel B of Table 2. 
 What Table 2, Panel B makes plain is that retirement accounts benefit from 
dividend arbitrage as long as x>0, but non-retirement accounts are hurt if x<τF.  Thus, 
dividend arbitrage moves value from non-retirement to retirement accounts if and only if 
0<x<τF.  Thus, the key empirical question is whether this is true. 
 We can observe directly whether 0<x<τF in the case of U.S. funds holding 
Canadian shares.  We can do this because we have a proprietary database of dividend-
arbitrage transactions by U.S. investors in Canadian firms.  These transactions are record-
date equity loans, and while the extensive form of the arbitrage, documented in the 
Appendix, is complex, the part we use is simple.  For a given record date, the τF in our 
example corresponds to 15% of the dividend, and the x in our example corresponds to the 
lending fee in the proprietary data.  So we can easily and unambiguously compare the 
U.S. investors’ arbitrage revenues to the tax savings at stake. 
This comparison is a big departure from the literature.  The many studies of 
dividend-arbitrage topics have uncovered much (see Elton, Gruber and Blake, 2002, for a 
review), but they do not show, as we do, what dividend arbitrageurs actually get.  It is 
generally unclear whether arbitrage is even feasible at all, since these studies rely on 
anonymous transactions in spot markets, where trading spreads can easily overwhelm the 
targeted tax savings.  For example, if a firm pays a 2% dividend in quarterly installments, 
then the targeted tax savings on a record date is 15% of 0.50%, or 0.075%, which is 3 
cents on a $40 stock.  Considering how big trades have to be to make economic sense 
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(n.b., the trades in our proprietary data are typically millions of dollars), a roundtrip 
transaction cost smaller than this seems highly unlikely.  This transactions-cost problem 
does not arise with equity loans because they do not convey economic exposure, and thus 
do not incur the adverse selection costs associated (e.g., Bagehot, 1971) with conveying 
economic exposure. 
To summarize, mutual funds damage the after-tax returns of their non-taxable 
accounts, but not their taxable accounts, when they increase the dividend yields of their 
cross-border holdings.  Dividend arbitrage may undo some of this damage, but if it 
doesn’t undo all of it then it does new damage to taxable accounts, in which case funds 
face conflicting preferences among their shareholders.  This raises the two empirical 
questions we address next: what does dividend arbitrage accomplish, and what do funds 
do? 
 
4. What does Dividend Arbitrage Accomplish? 
 Dividend arbitrage converts tax credits that only taxable accounts value into cash 
that all accounts value.  The rate of this conversion determines whether funds trade off 
the utilities of taxable and non-taxable accounts when choosing their dividend yields.  In 
this section we determine this conversion rate by comparing tax credits to arbitrage 
revenues, using our proprietary data on U.S. investors in Canadian shares.  In addition to 
these results on loan pricing, we also present results on loan volume from the UK market. 
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4.1 Pricing of Canadian Dividend Arbitrage 
The tax credit is simply 15% of the dividend amount.  That is, if the fund does not 
arbitrage, it gets 85% of the dividend in cash and 15% as a credit.  The arbitrage revenue 
that it compares to is the lending fee.  That is, if the fund does arbitrage, it gets 85% of 
the dividend in cash (as a reimbursement from the borrower, rather than as a payment 
from the issuer) plus the lending fee, but no credit.  Our database provides $676MM of 
record-date lending of Canadian shares, which includes 223 loans on 34 different record 
dates; for each record date i we calculate a single fee Fi by value-weighting the fees of 
the loans originated then.7  Since this fee is per dollar of stock value, it compares to the 
dividend per dollar of stock value, i.e., the dividend yield, so for record date i we let Yi be 
the dividend divided by the closing price on the day before the record date (the price that 
is used to determine the collateral for the loan).  With these definitions, the empirical 
question is whether F is less than 15% of Y. 
The answer to this question is plainly yes.  Looking across the 34 record dates, 
plotted as Figure 1, F/Y is less than 15% every time, with a maximum of 12%.  The mean 
and median are 4% and 2%, respectively, and it appears from the figure that arbitrage 
revenue is zero for dividends below 30bp or so, suggesting that fixed transactions costs 
make these dividends infeasible to arbitrage.  We can explore this more rigorously by 
regressing F on Y, which (as in McDonald, 2001) gives an intercept representing the 
fixed transactions cost, and a slope representing the lender’s recovery of the marginal unit 
of dividend yield  We convert both to basis points by multiplying by 10,000, and we get 
(standard errors in parentheses): 
                                                 
7 The lending fee in our database is an annual rate, and it applies to collateral equal to 102% of the shares’ 
value, so the fee we use is 102%(annual rate)(n/360), where n is the number of calendar days from the 
record date to the next business day. 
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Fi =     -2.9    + 0.1026Yi   R2=53.8% 
   (0.95)      (0.017)      N(obs)=34 
The slope coefficient is both significantly greater than 0 (t-statistic 6.11) and significantly 
less than 15% (t-statistic 2.82),8  which indicates a recovery that is positive but less than 
full, and the intercept is significantly negative with a point estimate of -3bp, consistent 
with a breakeven yield of 30bp (i.e., recovering 10% of 30bp offsets -3bp). 
 
4.2 Volume of UK Dividend Arbitrage 
 Our database of loan prices limits the results on dividend-arbitrage pricing to 
Canada.  However, we can explore dividend-arbitrage volume elsewhere in the world.  
Specifically, we can measure the effect of dividends on lending volume in the United 
Kingdom because the UK clearing corporation, CRESTCO, reports daily lending volume 
for the major UK stocks, the FTSE 250 and 100.  Because CRESTCO intermediates 
nearly all the outstanding shares of these listings, this shows us the economy-wide, not 
just single-lender, response of lending to dividends. 
 The UK tax regime differs somewhat from the Canadian regime9 but the 
economics of dividend arbitrage are qualitatively the same.  Non-UK accounts that 
cannot get the tax credit, such as US mutual funds’ retirement accounts, benefit from 
moving their shares to UK investors and sharing the regained credit.  Since the credit 
increases with the dividend yield, both the demand for and the supply of arbitrage capital 
should increase with the yield.  Thus, we can test whether arbitrage of UK dividends 
                                                 
8 Because the observation in the upper right of Figure 1 appears influential, we rerun the regression with 
this observation removed and we find the same thing: the slope is significantly greater than 0 (t-statistic 
3.43) and significantly less than 15% (t-statistic 4.12). 
9 A brief overview of the effective UK-US Tax Treaty is provided at www.ici.org/issues/glo/arc-
fsrv/01_uk_tax_treaty.html. To summarize, if a UK company pays a $90 dividend, it also pays $10 to the 
UK tax authority.  Both taxable and non-taxable accounts receive the $90, but taxable accounts also get a 
tax credit for the $10 paid to the tax authority. 
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operates through the lending market by testing whether lending volume increases with 
yield. 
 To run this test, we first identify all dividends covered by the sample, which runs 
from 9/01/03 to 6/03/04.  For each dividend we define four variables: DY, the dividend 
amount divided by the cum-dividend price, RDLOAN, the number of the issuer’s shares 
loaned on the record date, AVGLOAN, the average number of the issuer’s shares during 
the sample period, and SHARES, the number of the issuer’s shares held through 
CRESTCO on the record date.  The statistical question is whether RDLOAN increases 
with DY, controlling for the secular level of borrowing demand captured by AVGLOAN.  
We control for AVGLOAN two ways, by subtracting it from the left-hand side, and by 
including it on the right-hand side.  The point of calculating SHARES is that share 
ownership, and therefore demand for arbitrage by current investors, increases with 
SHARES, so we should control for it as well to separate its effect from that of DY.  
Regression results are in Table 3. 
 All tests show a strong relation between lending volume and dividend yield.  In 
Panel A, which represents all stocks in the database, the coefficients of about 2 billion on 
DY in the first two regressions associate a 100bp increase in yield with 1% of 2 billion, or 
20 million increase in loaned shares.  The coefficient of about 1 in the third regression 
associates a 1% increase in yield with a 1% increase in shares outstanding loaned.  Panel 
B repeats the regression with the closed-end funds removed and the same results obtain. 
 To summarize, dividend arbitrage is an important element of capital markets, but 
dividend arbitrage revenue falls short of recovering the cross-border dividend tax.  A 
fund’s retirement accounts thus face a net tax on cross-border dividends, so the fund’s 
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manager faces a tradeoff between the preferences of his retirement and taxable accounts.  
Retirement accounts prefer lower withholding tax and lower dividend yield, so if funds’ 
investment policies reflect their shareholders’ preferences, we should see withholding tax 
and dividend yield go down as the proportion of retirement money goes up.  The next 
section tests these predictions. 
 
5. Cross Section of Equity Funds 
 We take our predictions to the sample of 64 large international equity funds.  For 
each fund we have the proportion of the fund that is defined-contribution retirement 
money as of 12/31/02, and we have FY 2003 figures for dividends, withholding taxes and 
total net assets.  Therefore, we see directly whether dividends and withholding taxes, per 
dollar of shareholder money, decrease as retirement money, per dollar of shareholder 
money, increases.  As a robustness check, we then take our test design to the sample of 
domestic funds, where low dividends do not favor retirement accounts. 
 The variables we need are easily calculated.  For fund i, let Ri be the proportion of 
its assets that was DC retirement money as of 12/31/02, i.e., the DC figure for that fund 
as reported by Pensions and Investments divided by its 12/31/02 total net assets.  Also, let 
Ai be its average total net assets during its FY 2003, defined as the average of its total net 
assets as of the beginning, middle (i.e., semiannual) and end of FY 2003, and let Di and 
Wi be its total dividend income and foreign withholding tax, respectively, during FY 
2003.  With this notation, the hypothesis to test statistically is whether D/A and W/A go 
down as R goes up. 
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 We test the hypothesis with simple regressions of D/A and W/A on R, reported in 
Panel A of Table 4.  Both regressions reject the null, showing significant negative 
relations.  Thus, dividend yields and withholding taxes fall as retirement money rises, as 
they would if managers balance the preferences of their shareholders. 
The hypothesis also makes a prediction for the relation between withholding taxes 
and dividends.  Because dividend arbitrage benefits retirement accounts at the expense of 
non-retirement accounts, and because it reduces W relative to D, we should also expect 
W/D to fall as R rises.  We test this with an analogous regression, reported in the same 
panel.  In this case we find borderline statistical significance, with a p-value of 6.7%. 
A potential concern with the Panel A regressions is that they do not account for 
the subtypes of international equity funds.  Retirement investors might sort into 
international-fund subtypes that have low dividends for some other reason, and that might 
drive our result.  To test our hypothesis against this possibility, we repeat the regressions 
with indicator variables for the various subtypes.  We have two sources of subtypes, 
Lipper’s index groupings and Morningstar’s style boxes. 
The Lipper subtypes correspond to their indices of international-equity mutual 
fund returns.  The sample includes funds in five of these subtypes: International, 
Emerging Market, European, International Small Cap, and Pacific.  Accordingly, we re-
run the three regressions with indicator variables for each type except International.  The 
results, in Panel B of Table 4, are similar to those from the simple regressions.  The 
relations of withholding tax and dividends to the proportion of retirement money are 
significantly negative, and the relation of withholding tax per dollar of dividends is 
negative but less significant, now with a p-value of 10.7%.  So at these rejection levels, 
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the regressions bear out the hypothesis even when we control for subtypes within the 
fund category. 
Morningstar style boxes are a 3 by 3 matrix, {Value, Blend, Growth} by {Small 
Cap, Medium Cap, Large Cap}.  They are appealing for our purpose in that they are 
widely reported, but they have a drawback in that they introduce some endogeneity.  This 
is because assignments to boxes are not by funds’ stated objectives, but rather by their 
portfolio weights, so they are endogenous to the effect of dividend-yield objectives on 
portfolio weights.  We employ them analogously to Panel B, with indicator variables for 
Value, Growth, Small-Cap and Large-Cap.  The results, in Panel C of Table 4, are again 
similar to before, though significances have swapped.  Now the relations of withholding 
tax and withholding tax per dollar of dividends are significantly negative at standard 
rejection levels, and dividend yield is negative with a p-value of 13.1%, whose size may 
reflect endogeneity of style-box assignments to dividend yield. 
An alternative explanation for the Table 4 results is that the observed relation 
reflects investors’ preferences, rather than managers’ adaptation to the composition of 
their assets under management.  That is, retirement allocations correlate with dividend 
yields not because managers respond to their shareholders’ preferences but because 
shareholders’ preferences for their retirement savings correlate with dividend yield.  This 
is a testable proposition because we can repeat the test with international funds replaced 
by domestic funds.  The virtue of domestic funds, for this purpose, is that lower dividends 
do no favor for their retirement accounts, so if retirement allocations correlate with 
dividend yield it is for some other reason than managers responding to their shareholders’ 
preferences. 
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To test the hypothesis that retirement allocations to domestic funds correlate with 
dividend yield, we repeat the test of Table 4 on the analogous sample of domestic funds.  
Domestic funds are much more numerous than international funds, so this sample is 
much larger, 434 funds rather than 64.  As with the international funds, we collect the 
Morningstar style-box assignments for one set of controls, but for the other set we use the 
major ICDI fund categories rather than Lipper index groupings because for domestic 
funds, Lipper index groupings are largely the same as Morningstar style boxes.  Since 
withholding tax is not an issue, the only dependent variable for each set of regressors is 
D/A.  The results, in Table 5, show no statistically significant relation, with or without the 
controls.  Thus, the results in Table 4 are not a feature of funds in general, but of 
international funds in particular, further evidence for our hypothesis. 
A remaining possible explanation for Table 4 is that investment policies line up 
with retirement allocations because investors impute expected investment policies into 
their retirement allocations.  There is ultimately some amount of observational 
equivalence between the investor-driven and manager-driven explanations, but we view 
the investor-driven explanation as highly unlikely, for two reasons.  First, we have 
detected no public awareness of the effect of cross-border taxation on retirement 
accounts.  And second, if taxable and non-taxable allocations respond differently to this 
tax burden, one would also expect them to respond differently to better-known tax 
burdens, but from Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) it appears they do not. 
To summarize, managers’ investment policies reflect their investors’ preferences.  
Policies grow more favorable to retirement accounts when they serve more retirement 
accounts.  This is not what we would see if managers maximize their total returns, at least 
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not the total returns the public sees.  To do that, they would all avoid tax credits as much 
as possible, since the credits do not figure in the total returns the public sees even though 
they are valuable to taxable accounts.  In other words, managers would behave as if all of 
their money were retirement money, but we find that they don’t.  By the same token, the 
funds’ objective is not after-tax returns either, because then they would behave as if all 
their money were taxable money, which they don’t. 
The immediate implications of our results are for mutual-fund investors.  But due 
to the economic magnitude of retirement investing, they also have implications for 
aggregate cross-border investing.  The next section addresses the effect of dividend yield 
on aggregate cross-border investing by U.S. institutions in general and mutual funds in 
particular, and it also compares this effect to the analogous effect in Canada, where the 
taxation of foreign and domestic dividends is different in a key way. 
 
6. Aggregate Investment 
 Another way to relate shareholders’ preferences to their funds’ policies is to 
compare the weights that U.S. and Canadian mutual funds put on U.S. and Canadian 
stocks.  This is because the Canadian international funds that hold equities have no 
retirement accounts, so they all have R=0, whereas the U.S. funds have R>0.  That is not 
to say that Canadians do not put retirement money in international mutual funds; they do, 
but Canadian tax law directs this money to funds that hold derivatives rather than 
equities.  In this section we discuss the important regulatory background and then test 
predictions for the effect of dividend yield on the difference between Canadian and U.S. 
weights in Canadian and U.S. stocks. 
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6.1 Tax-Induced Preferences of Canadian Mutual-Fund Accounts 
 Mingling of retirement and non-retirement savings is significantly reduced in 
Canada retirement savings by Retirement Savings Plan, or RSP, funds.  RSP funds do not 
hold foreign equities, due to Canada’s Foreign Content Rule.  This rule grants retirement-
savings tax treatment only to funds invested at least 70% in Canada, but a fund satisfies 
this rule if it invests in Canadian securities, such as government bonds, and swaps their 
returns for cross-border returns with a Canadian swap counterparty. 
This may seem obscure but it has two important effects.  First, because RSP funds 
hold bonds and swaps rather than equities, their holdings do not show up on the database 
of equity holdings.  Second, because non-RSP funds do hold equities, the cross-border 
equity holdings that our database reports are by funds with significantly less retirement 
money. 
The preferences of the U.S. and the Canadian mutual-fund accounts are further 
differentiated by Canada’s Dividend Tax Credit.  This is a tax-rate reduction enjoyed by 
taxable Canadian accounts, but not U.S. accounts, on Canadian dividends, but not U.S. 
dividends (see, e.g., Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1983, and Booth, 1987).  Putting all this 
together, less of the Canadian investment pays an extra tax on U.S. dividends, and some 
pays a reduced tax on Canadian dividends.  Meanwhile, some of the U.S. accounts pay an 
extra tax, and none pay a reduced tax, on Canadian dividends, and none of them pay an 
extra tax on U.S. dividends. 
For illustration, consider the effective marginal rates from 2001, the year of the 
dividends we look at.  For that year, Canadians in the highest bracket pay 46% on U.S. 
dividends, 31% on Canadian dividends, and 23% on both Canadian and U.S. capital 
 24
gains.10  A U.S. investor in the highest bracket pays 39% on all dividends and 20% on all 
long-term capital gains.11  So both the U.S. and the Canadian investor pay about twice as 
much tax on U.S. dividends as on U.S. or Canadian capital gains, but the Canadian 
taxable investor pays on Canadian dividends only 2/3 the tax she pays on U.S. dividends.  
So if funds’ investment policies reflect their shareholders’ preferences, then the dividend 
yield of a U.S. stock should have little effect on its relative appeal to U.S. and Canadian 
funds, but the dividend yield of a Canadian stock should boost its relative appeal to 
Canadian funds. 
 
6.2 Empirical Test 
 The goal of the test design is to relate the difference between U.S. and Canadian 
portfolio weights of a U.S. or Canadian stock to the stock’s dividend yield and 
nationality.  The sample of stocks is all U.S. and Canadian stocks on the SEC’s Official 
List for 12/31/00.  For each stock i we calculate the explanatory variables: the annual 
dividend ADYi is its 2001 dividends divided by its 12/31/00 price, and CDNi is 1 if the 
stock is Canadian, and 0 otherwise.  We then calculate five portfolio weights, all as of 
12/31/00: VWi is its value weight in this universe, US13Fi and CDN13Fi are its weights in 
the aggregated 13f filings of U.S. institutions and Canadian institutions, respectively, and 
USMFi and CDNMFi are its weights in the aggregated filings of U.S. and Canadian 
mutual funds, respectively (for each fund active as of 12/31/00, the last filing dated on or 
before 12/31/00).  
                                                 
10 From the Appendix to Chapter 1 of Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe and Roberts (2001) and T1 General 2001 
Income Tax and Benefit Package for Ontario. 
 
11 From 2001 1040 Forms and Instructions, tax rate schedules on page 71 and capital gain tax worksheet on 
page 34. 
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To test our hypothesis, we regress CDN13F-US13F and CDNMF-USMF on CDN, 
ADY and CDN*ADY.  With this model, CDN picks up non-dividend sources of home bias 
and ADY picks up dividend preference across stocks in general, leaving the interaction 
term to pick up the preference for Canadian dividends in particular.  A benefit we gain by 
looking at the difference between two groups of institutional investors is that the 
regression does not pick up general preferences of institutional investors, which 
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) conjecture could explain their results on ownership of 
Swedish stocks.  That is, the general preferences of institutional investors are on both 
sides of the difference, so they wash out.  Results are in the first rows of Panels A and B 
of Table 6. 
 What we find is a significant effect of Canadian firms’ dividends, pushing 
Canadian stocks from U.S. funds to Canadian funds, and no significant effect of U.S. 
firms’ dividends.  This holds for all institutions combined but is strongest for mutual 
funds in particular.  To separate the effect on U.S. funds from the effect on Canadian 
funds, we rerun the regressions with CDNMF-USMF decomposed into CDNMF-VW and 
USMF-VW and CDN13F-US13F decomposed into CDN13F-VW and US13F-VW.  The 
results, in the second and third rows of the same panels, show a much larger effect on the 
Canadian portfolio weights, which is what one would expect if a quantity of shares 
moved from the U.S. portfolio to the much smaller Canadian portfolio. 
To summarize, this section finds additional evidence that funds’ investment 
policies reflect the preferences of their investors.  Differing tax laws and retirement 
schemes impart differing preferences on the fund accounts represented by the holdings 
data, and the funds’ investment policies reflect these differences.  As before, this is not 
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what would obtain if managers were simply maximizing their reported total returns.  
Canadian funds’ total returns do not reflect their shareholders’ tax credits, but their 
investment policies do. 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
If a fund’s shareholders knew what its manager knew, they would not agree what 
its manager should do.  In particular, retirement and non-retirement accounts have 
conflicting preferences, and one of these conflicts concerns cross-border dividends.  The 
tax credits they produce are useless to retirement accounts but useful to non-retirement 
accounts, so a manager cannot maximize expected utility of both account types unless he 
can convert the credits into their full cash value through dividend arbitrage.  Our first 
main empirical result is that this conversion is significantly less than full, so managers of 
international-equity funds have a choice to make, if they are maximizing with their 
shareholder preferences in mind.  They can favor their retirement accounts with lower 
dividends and tax credits, so if funds’ investment policies reflect their shareholders, then 
these quantities should go down as retirement money goes up. 
Our second main empirical result is that in the cross section of international funds, 
this is exactly what we find.  As the proportion of retirement money goes up, dividend 
yield goes down, foreign tax credits go down, and tax credits per dollar of dividends go 
down.  This is true even if we control for the subtypes of international funds, both the 
Lipper index groups and the Morningstar style boxes, and it is not true for domestic 
funds, where the tax-efficiency argument does not apply.  So the managers’ objective is 
not the returns enjoyed by retirement accounts, or the returns enjoyed by non-retirement 
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accounts, but somewhere in between, depending on how much retirement money resides 
in their particular funds.  Similarly, we find that the differing investment policies of U.S. 
and Canadian funds match the differing preferences induced by the two regulatory 
systems. 
Our findings open up a new dimension in the analysis of mutual funds.  We trace 
an important cross-sectional variation among funds to the composition of their current 
investors. This is not an agency problem but rather the opposite, a successful delegation 
of investment decisions.  This is not to say that money management does not exhibit 
agency problems, evidence of such problems is strong and diverse, but it does show that 
to at least some extent, we can understand what fund managers do by looking closely at 
what they are supposed to do.
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Appendix 
Suppose a U.S. mutual fund, call it Taxwise International Fund, has 100,000 shares of 
TransCanada Pipelines, paying C$0.29/share to shareholders of record on 6/30/04.  
Absent arbitrage, Taxwise gets (0.85)(C$0.29)(100000) = C$24,650 in cash and the 
remaining C$4,350 as a credit.  Here is a structure, represented in Figure A1, by which 
Taxwise converts the credit into some cash:12 
  A U.S. arbitrageur shorts 100,000 shares cum-dividend to a Canadian arbitrageur, and 
repurchases them ex-dividend, borrowing the shares from Taxwise.  The U.S. 
arbitrageur earns market interest on the short-sale proceeds. 
  The arbitrageurs enter a swap whereby the Canadian pays his price return plus 
C$24,650, and gets market interest on the proceeds minus a discount D. 
  The U.S. arbitrageur pays C$24,650 to Taxwise as reimbursement for the dividend, 
and also pays a lending fee F. 
All put together, Taxwise exchanges the C$4,350 credit for F in cash, the U.S. 
arbitrageur makes D-F, and the Canadian arbitrageur makes C$4,350-D.  In our data we 
see the C$4,350 and the F, it’s only the sharing D between the arbitrageurs we don’t see. 
A key goal of this structure is for Taxwise not to loan directly to the Canadian.  If 
it were to loan to the Canadian then he Canadian tax authority would oblige the Canadian 
to withhold from the dividend reimbursement just as TransCanada would withhold from 
the dividend.  It is worth noting also that the hedge from the swap makes the Canadian 
ineligible for Canada’s dividend tax credit (though the Canadian might evade detection 
by routing the swap through another party). 
                                                 
12 Market participants tell us this is the popular structure. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics for mutual-fund samples.  2002 DC and 2002 TNA are DC money and Total Net Assets 
as of 12/31/02, A is average Total Net Assets across the beginning, middle and end of FY 2003, D and W 
are dividend income and foreign withholding in FY 2003, all in $MM. R is 2002 DC divided by 2002 TNA.  
Panel A covers the sample of 64 International funds, and Panel B covers the sample of 434 Domestic funds 
 Mean Median Min Max Total 
A. International      
2002 DC 591.4 96.0 3.8 11047.0 37847.8 
2002 TNA 1829.7 553.0 108.8 24786.0 117101.8 
R 24.0% 17.5% 0.5% 87.8%  
D 47.2 17.1 2.5 506.4 3021.6 
A 1985.0 636.0 118.7 24911.6 127039.9 
W 5.2 1.7 0.2 61.9 330.4 
D/A 2.41% 2.42% 1.48% 3.80%  
W/A 26.3bp 25.8bp 12.9bp 41.2bp  
W/D 10.9% 11.1% 6.4% 14.0%  
      
B.  Domestic      
2002 DC 948.7 162.5 0.2 38012.0 411732.8 
2002 TNA 3080.5 930.0 100.5 68145.5 1336918.5 
R 24.7% 18.0% 0.0% 100%  
D 50.0 9.8 0.0 1395.6 21682.9 
A 3472.8 991.7 103.1 80133.3 1507203.8 
D/A 1.19% 1.06% 0% 5.36%  
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Table 2 
Post-tax returns of accounts types.  The value in a cell is the value to one share in an account of the type 
indicated at the top of the column that accrues from income into the fund, which has n shares, of the type 
indicated at the left of the row.  The tax rates applied to retirement accounts upon retirement is τT, the rates 
applied to dividend and capital-gains income of non-retirement accounts are τD and τG, respectively, and the 
tax rate of foreign dividend withholding is τF.  Panel A assumes no dividend arbitrage, and Panel B assumes 
arbitrage of a fraction a of dividend income, where the fund receives x of the dividend amount in cash in 
exchange for the credit. 
 Retirement Non-Retirement 
A.  No Dividend Arbitrage   
1 of Dividends (1-τT)(1-τF)/n (1-τD)/n 
1 of Capital Gains (1-τT)/n (1-τG)/n 
   
B.  Arbitrage a of Dividend   
1 of Dividends (1-τF+ax)(1-τT)/n (1-a[τF-x])(1-τD)/n 
1 of Capital Gains (1-τT)/n (1-τG)/n 
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Table 3 
Dividend yield and arbitrage volume in the United Kingdom. For a given dividend record date between 
9/01/03 and 6/03/04, RDLoan is the number of the issuer’s shares held through CRESTCO that were loaned 
that day.  AvgLoan is the average number loaned for that issuer from 9/01/03 to 6/03/04.  Shares is the 
number of the issuer’s shares held through CRESTCO on the record date. DY is the dividend yield for the 
firm defined as the dividend divided by the cum-dividend price.  Panel A has 443 observations and Panel B 
has 398. 
 
Dep. Variable Intercept DY Shares 
A. All firms:    
RDLoan –AvgLoan -8.71e+06 
 (-0.80) 
1.92e+09 
 (3.37) 
0.004996 
 (2.92) 
RDLoan -6.04e+06 
(-0.50) 
2.51e+09 
(3.94) 
.01949 
(10.19) 
(RDLoan –AvgLoan)/Shares -0.00093 
(-0.25) 
1.1209 
(5.59) 
 
    
B. All firms except closed-end funds:    
RDLoan -AvgLoan -7.50e+06 
(-0.62) 
1.98e+09 
 (3.19) 
0.00486 
 (2.69) 
RDLoan -3.52e+06 
(-0.26) 
2.57e+09 
(3.71) 
.01926 
(9.55) 
(RDLoan –AvgLoan)/Shares .000164 
(0.04) 
1.1507 
(5.31) 
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Table 4 
Tests for whether foreign equity funds’ retirement tax efficiency increases with their retirement allocations.  
R is the defined contributions reported by Pension and Investments on December 31, 2002 divided by the 
TNA reported in CRSP for the same time. These are the 64 foreign equity mutual funds with available data 
and TNA over $100 million.  W and D are Withholding Tax and Dividend Income, respectively, in FY 
2003, and A is average TNA over the same period.  Panel A uses indicator variables for Lipper index 
groupings: Emerging, Europe, Small International and Pacific.  Panel B includes indicator variables for 
fund types from Morningstar style-box assignments: Large, Small, Growth and Value.  T-statistics are 
provided below in parentheses and italics, and for the coefficients on R, rejection of the null hypothesis that 
the true coefficient is non-negative (i.e., that the true relation between tax efficiency for retirement accounts 
and retirement allocations is non-positive) is indicated: * denotes rejection at the 10% level, ** at 5%, and 
*** at 1%.  
Dep. Variable W/A D/A W/D 
A. No Controls:   
Intercept 28.69 
(24.06) 
0.0256 
(28.98) 
0.112 
(36.99) 
R -9.923 
(-2.66)*** 
-0.0060 
(-2.15)** 
-0.014 
(-1.52)* 
    
B. Lipper Index Controls:   
Intercept 28.376 
(22.41) 
0.0252 
(26.71) 
0.113 
(34.28) 
R -8.171 
(-2.24)** 
-0.0047 
(-1.75)** 
-0.012 
(-1.26) 
Emerging 1.174 
(0.42) 
0.0035 
(1.66) 
-0.01 
(-1.43) 
Europe 4.891 
(1.57) 
0.0028 
(1.20) 
0.004 
(0.54) 
Intl.  Small -2.177 
(-0.70) 
-0.0022 
(-0.93) 
0.003 
(0.34) 
Pacific -11.801 
(-2.73) 
-0.0069 
(-2.13) 
-0.027 
(-2.36) 
   
C. Morningstar Style-Box Controls   
Intercept 27.659 
(11.58) 
0.0267 
(16.67) 
0.104 
(16.36) 
R -8.164 
(-2.12)** 
-0.0029 
(-1.13) 
-0.020 
(-1.98)** 
Small 0.922 
(0.19) 
-0.0014 
(-0.42) 
0.011 
(0.87) 
Large 2.472 
(1.03) 
0.0003 
(0.19) 
0.008 
(1.28) 
Value 0.730 
(0.28) 
0.0001 
(0.07) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
Growth -3.905 
(-2.28) 
-0.0051 
(-4.47) 
0.006 
(1.31) 
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Table 5 
Tests for whether domestic equity funds’ dividend yields relate to their retirement allocations.  R is the 
defined contributions reported by Pension and Investments on December 31, 2002 divided by the TNA 
reported in CRSP for the same time. These are the 434 domestic equity mutual funds with available data 
and TNA over $100 million.  D is Dividend Income in FY 2003, and A is average TNA over the same 
period. Panel B includes indicator variables for the fund types as assigned by ICDI: AG, for Aggressive 
Growth, GI, for Growth and Income, and LG, for Long-term Growth. Panel B includes indicator variables 
for fund types from Morningstar style-box assignments: Large, Small, Growth and Value.   T-statistics are 
provided below and in italics and parentheses, and for the coefficients on R, rejection of the null hypothesis 
that the true coefficient is zero is indicated:  * denotes rejection at the 10% level, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. 
Dep. Variable  D/A  
A. No Controls:   
Intercept  0.0126 
(22.88) 
 
R  -0.0025 
(-1.49) 
 
    
B. ICDI Category Controls:   
Intercept  0.0183 
(19.77) 
 
R  -0.0015 
(-1.13) 
 
AG  -0.0113 
(-10.79) 
 
GI  -0.0000 
(-0.01) 
 
LG  -0.0075 
(-7.39) 
 
   
C. Morningstar Style-Box Controls   
Intercept  0.0109 
(19.38) 
 
R  0.0002 
(0.26) 
 
Small  -0.0011 
(-1.74) 
 
Large  0.0050 
(10.03) 
 
Value  0.0063 
(11.50) 
 
Growth  -0.0071 
(-15.14) 
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Table 6  
Canadian and U.S. institutional equity holdings related to dividend yields. VWi is the value weight of stock 
i among all U.S.-listed stocks.  From the 13f filings for 12/31/00 we calculate the aggregate portfolio of all 
reporting U.S. institutions, and the aggregate portfolio of all reporting Canadian institutions; US13Fi is the 
weight of stock i in the former, and CDN13Fi is its weight in the latter.  From mutual funds’ most recent 
portfolio disclosures as of 12/31/00 we calculate the analogous statistics USMFi and CDNMFi.  The 
dividend yield of stock i, ADYi, is its 2001 dividends divided by its 12/31/00 price.  CDNi is 1 if stock i is 
Canadian, and 0 otherwise.  The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (below, in italics and parentheses) 
from regressions where the independent variables are CDNi, ADYi and CDNi*ADYi, and the dependent 
variables are as indicated. 
Dep. Variable Intercept CDNi ADYi CDNi*ADYi 
A. All Institutions:     
CDN13Fi-US13Fi -0.00002 
 (-4.01) 
0.00082 
 (14.9) 
0.00012 
 (0.65) 
0.0977 
(25.0) 
CDN13Fi-VWi -0.00002 
 (-4.11) 
0.00077 
(13.7) 
0.00001 
(0.07) 
0.08933 
(22.3) 
US13Fi-VWi -0.000001 
 (-0.44) 
-0.00005 
(-2.13) 
-0.00011 
(-1.33) 
-0.00837 
 (-4.94) 
     
B. Mutual Funds:     
CDNMFi-USMFi -0.00009 
 (-7.23) 
0.00173 
 (14.5) 
0.00013 
 (0.26) 
0.25001 
(29.3) 
CDNMFi-VWi -0.0001 
 (-6.71) 
0.001719 
(13.4) 
-0.00017 
(-0.32) 
0.2427 
(26.5) 
USMFi-VWi -0.0000 
 (-0.00) 
-0.00002 
(-0.36) 
-0.00029 
(-1.68) 
-0.00731 
 (-2.38) 
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Figure 1:  Lending Revenue v. Dividend Yield.  For each record date, the dividend yield Yi is on the 
horizontal axis and the lending revenue Fi is on the vertical axis. 
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Figure A1.  Structure of Withholding-Tax Arbitrage Between U.S. and Canada. 
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